The measured book-tax gap is often used as a surrogate for one of the behaviors that influences the gap-earnings management or tax sheltering-without adjusting for the effect of other influences-GAAP changes, tax law changes, and macroeconomic conditions. This paper provides evidence on the quality of the unadjusted book-tax income gap as a proxy for earnings management or tax sheltering by adjusting for the three measurable factors: GAAP changes, macroeconomic conditions, and earnings management. I find that changes in GAAP alone explain half of the pooled crosssectional variation in the book-tax gap between 1993 and 2004, marking GAAP changes as an important recent influence on the book-tax gap. Also, replication results using unadjusted and adjusted book-tax gap measures suggest that the unadjusted book-tax gap is a reasonable proxy for earnings management, but that adjusting for the effect of GAAP changes generates a better proxy for tax sheltering in most contexts.
INTRODUCTION
Conceptually, the book-tax income gap reflects factors that impact either book income or taxable income. Computation rules-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and tax code and case law (tax law)-limit management's discretion in calculating book income and tax income, respectively, though certain real decisions afford management some choice in the application of these rules. Macroeconomic conditions differentially influence both book and tax income and impact the book-tax gap. Finally, the effects of management's reporting discretion in determining book income (earnings management) and taxable income (tax sheltering) also affect the book-tax income gap. 1 Because academics, tax administrators, and policymakers are concerned about earnings management or tax sheltering, the book-tax gap is often used as a proxy for either earnings management or tax sheltering behavior. For example, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) use the book-tax gap to test the relationship between tax sheltering and managerial compensation and policy makers such as Talisman (1999) infer changes in tax sheltering behavior from changes in the book-tax gap.
However, research has not empirically documented the extent to which these opportunistic reporting behaviors contribute to the book-tax gap. Additionally, variation in the book-tax gap caused by variation in the extraneous influences-GAAP, tax law and macroeconomic conditions-may make the book-tax gap a poor proxy for the desired influences-earnings management and tax sheltering.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the validity of the book-tax gap as a proxy for earnings management or tax sheltering and to explore modifications that may improve the book-tax gap as a proxy for earnings management or tax sheltering. I use annual financial statement data to validate the book-tax income gap as a proxy for earnings management or tax sheltering by both decomposing the variation in the book-tax gap and by replicating prior research using a book-tax gap adjusted for the effect of certain factors. Decomposing the variation in the book-tax gap is central to testing the impact of the various factors and potentially improving the proxy. If the extraneous factors create significant variation in the book-tax gap, removing their effect purifies the variable as a measure of variation in the desired factors. Using the explained variation in the book-tax income gap as the measure of significance, I establish the relative importance of the three measured factors-changes in GAAP, earnings management, and the macroeconomic conditions faced by the firm-and suggest the maximum influence of the unmeasured factors-tax sheltering and changes to tax law.
2 I find that a small subset of changes in GAAP alone explains 50.45% of the variation in the book-tax income gap between 1993 and 2004. Also, macroeconomic conditions and earnings management behavior are both incrementally informative. In all specifications, macroeconomic conditions are more informative than earnings management. In total, the three measured factors explain approximately 55% of the variation in the book-tax income gap. Thus, the residual variation of 45% is the upper bound of variation potentially attributable to variation in tax law and tax sheltering behavior. While quantifying the variation explained by the three factors I measure confirms their influence on the book-tax income gap, these influences confound research inferences only if the extraneous variables are correlated with other regression variables.
To demonstrate the importance of considering these other influential factors in research designs that use the book-tax gap to proxy for earnings management or tax sheltering, I next replicate two prior studies- Hanlon (2005) and Lisowsky (2009)-using both the unadjusted book-tax income gap and three alternative gap measures that separately subtract out the effect of changes in GAAP, macroeconomic conditions, and earnings management behavior. Consistent with Hanlon (2005) , I
find that firm-years with large book-tax differences have less persistent pre-tax income than firmyears with small book-tax differences, whether the book-tax gap is unadjusted or is adjusted for changes in GAAP or macroeconomic conditions. Subtracting the effect of earnings management changes the sign regarding large negative book-tax differences and significantly attenuates the effect of large positive book-tax differences. By showing that results degrade after controlling for earnings management, my results confirm Hanlon's interpretation of book-tax differences as a proxy for earnings management. Despite the relatively low explanatory power of discretionary accruals in my tests of variation, earnings management is an important factor affecting the book-tax gap. Thus, adjustments do not appear necessary when using the book-tax gap to proxy for earnings management.
I also calculate correlations between various measures of the book-tax income gap and the likelihood of a tax shelter as predicted by Lisowsky (2009) . Removing effects of non-sheltering factors should increase the correlation. I find that subtracting the effect of GAAP changes from the book-tax gap increases the association between the book-tax gap and the Lisowsky (2009) predicted value. Subtracting the effect of earnings management has no significant effect on the likelihood of a tax shelter. However, subtracting the effect of macroeconomic conditions from the book-tax gap considerably lessens the association between the book-tax gap and the predicted likelihood of a tax shelter, suggesting a relationship between macroeconomic conditions and tax sheltering that may confound research if not properly considered. These results confirm that the portion of the book-tax income gap not attributable to the three factors studied here is in part attributable to tax sheltering.
Adjustments to the book-tax gap to remove non-tax effects increase the gap's ability to proxy for tax sheltering. I conclude that adjusting the book-tax gap for GAAP changes and potentially for general business conditions improves the book-tax gap as a predictor of the likelihood of a tax shelter.
My research advances literature on the book-tax income gap in three ways. First, I develop a simple model that outlines five specific factors that impact the book-tax income gap and provide a framework for defining and interpreting variables. Next, I establish the variation in the book-tax income gap explained by changes to these factors. I show that GAAP changes alone explain over 50% of the variation in the book-tax income gap between 1993 and 2004. Finally, I replicate prior research to assess the need to adjust the book-tax income gap for these factors to better isolate the effect of earnings management or tax sheltering behavior. I find that the unadjusted book-tax gap is a reasonable proxy for earnings management but that subtracting the effect of GAAP changes from the gap creates a better proxy for likelihood of tax sheltering in most contexts.
Section 2 develops a simple model of the factors that affect the book-tax income gap and discusses related research. Section 3 outlines the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design, including variable definitions and sample specifics. Results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 presents robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
MODEL AND RELATED RESEARCH

Model of the Book-Tax Income Gap
Because the financial statements and tax returns are prepared under separate regimes whose governing bodies do not have identical objectives, natural differences exist between income reported on financial statements and income reported on tax returns. The book-tax income gap is a function of factors affecting income reported on the financial statement and income reported on the tax return: accounting rules (GAAP), earnings management behavior (EM), tax law, aggressive avoidance and tax sheltering behavior (Sheltering), and general business conditions (GBC):
Variation in these factors will cause predictable cross-sectional variation in the book-tax income gap.
Though variation in GAAP and tax law can occur when real decisions are made to allow more desirable reported income or when firms interpret rules differently, variation in these variables will primarily occur through standard or law changes.
Corporate tax law does not change significantly during the period 1993-2004. Therefore, I do not include measures of tax law changes in my tests.
3 By its nature, tax sheltering is extremely difficult to measure. 4 Instead of attempting to measure tax sheltering and variation in tax sheltering, this research focuses on estimating the variation in the Book-Tax Income gap caused by variation in factors that are more easily quantified; residual variation is the upper bound available to be explained by unmeasured variables. Equation (4) simplifies equation (3) by removing changes in tax law and variation in tax sheltering so that these unmeasurable factors fall into the residual as follows:
Related Research
Recent literature has expanded consideration of the book-tax gap from a measure of the tradeoffs between cash flow and reported income to a proxy for financial statement quality or tax aggressiveness. Recent research also studies variables which affect the level of the book-tax gap. Manzon and Plesko (2002) show that a relatively small set of financial statement variables, including measures of Fixed and Intangible Assets and NOL Carryforwards, explain the increase in the book-3 While corporate tax law does not change significantly between 1993 and 2004, a number of provisions are implemented that may affect the Book-Tax Income Gap. These include, but are not limited to, enacting tax amortization for purchased intangible assets, creating check-the-box regulations for certain domestic and foreign firms, increasing tax depreciation allowances for purchases after September 11, 2001, and enacting a tax holiday on repatriated foreign earnings. Because I interpret the residual variation as due to all omitted variables, including tax law changes, omitting tax law changes does not bias the tests. I further discuss the effect of omitting tax law changes, including their likely correlation with included variables, in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. 4 See McGill and Outslay (2004) for instances where a thorough study of the financial statements does and does not provide sufficient disclosure to uncover a tax shelter. Most research on tax shelters uses case law or firm disclosures to identify firms that the IRS has targeted for sheltering (see Graham and Tucker, 2006 tax income gap observed in the late 1990s. Although Manzon and Plesko (2002) find that accounting figures, some of which proxy for factors outlined in my model, are extremely informative for the book-tax income gap, they selected financial statement variables to capture the mechanical relationship rather than the underlying cause. The reader is left uncertain how to interpret the coefficient changes. My model above outlines the conceptual factors that affect the book-tax income gap and provides a framework for defining and interpreting variables.
Other recent literature more directly studies the relationship between the book-tax income gap and some of the factors outlined in my model. A number of papers link measures of the book-tax gap and earnings management. Mills and Newberry (2001) find that public firms have larger negative book-tax income gaps when in a loss position than private firms, suggesting that earnings management via "big bath" behavior affects the book-tax gap. Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2003) show that deferred tax expense is incrementally useful in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline or a loss. Hanlon (2005) finds that firms with small temporary book-tax differences have more persistent book earnings than firms with large temporary book-tax differences. Similar to Phillips et al (2003) , Hanlon's results suggest that the book-tax income gap can be used to identify firms that participate in persistence-decreasing earnings management. The results in Phillips et al (2003) and Hanlon (2005) hinge on non-conforming earnings management-conforming earnings management will not alter book-tax differences or the deferred tax expense. Badertscher, Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2009) examine restatements and find that in 63% of these events, the earnings management was non-conforming, meaning that book income was changed without affecting taxable income. Badertscher et al (2009) confirm that firms utilize non-conforming earnings management.
While the above papers suggest a relationship between the book-tax gap and earnings management, these papers do not test the relative importance of this relationship or validate the book-tax gap as a proxy for earnings management behavior.
Recent literature also links the size of the book-tax income gap with the presence of a tax shelter. Desai (2003) shelters and finds that controlling for other firm characteristics, such as whether the firm has a subsidiary in a tax haven or engages in 'mezzanine financing', removes the association between the book-tax income gap and the likelihood a firm has engaged in a tax shelter. Despite some research, the exact relationship between tax sheltering and the book-tax gap remains uncertain.
HYPOTHESES
Predictable Variation in the Book-Tax Gap
The model in Section 2.1 outlines five factors that affect the book-tax income gap, three of which are measured in this study. My first proposition is that variation in these three measured factors explains a significant portion of variation in the book-tax gap. That is, I expect that there is predictable variation in the book-tax income gap caused by changes in GAAP across time and variation in General Business Conditions and Earnings Management across both time and industry.
Interpretation of Prior Research that Uses the Book-Tax Gap
Measures of the book-tax income gap often proxy for earnings management or tax sheltering.
My model shows that a number of factors-not just earnings management and tax sheltering-shape the book-tax gap. Removing the effect of these alternative factors should improve the book-tax gap as a proxy for earnings management and tax sheltering. Interpretation of prior results may be revised if controlling for alternative factors alters the results in prior literature.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) govern how firms prepare and present financial statements. GAAP is constantly evolving-on average, four FASB pronouncements are issued every year during the sample period of 1993-2004. These pronouncements may increase book income, decrease book income, affect only the presentation and not the calculation of income items, or not affect income items at all. Many changes in GAAP do not correspond to changes in tax law.
Therefore, changes to the GAAP calculation of book income affect the book-tax income gap.
H1a: Controlling for GAAP Changes improves the explanatory power of the book-tax for earnings management. H1b: Controlling for GAAP Changes improves the explanatory power of the book-tax gap for tax sheltering.
General Business Conditions
General business conditions (GBC) likely also affect the book-tax income gap. Economic fluctuations affect the level of both book income and taxable income. For example, during recessionary times both book and taxable will likely fall as consumer spending decreases. Largely due to the accrual vs. transaction-driven nature of book vs. taxable income that allows book income to reflect expectations or market values for certain accounts, book income is expected to respond more quickly to general business conditions than taxable income. For example, in expansionary times, book income will reflect increase market values for publicly traded securities as unrealized gains; taxable income will instead reflect the gains when the securities are sold. Therefore, it is unlikely that macroeconomic effects on book and taxable income are related such that the book-tax gap would be unaffected. General business conditions also influence business decisions, such as the amount and type of investment to undertake and how to finance this investment. These business decisions impact the book-tax gap. For example, lower interest rates may increase investment in long-term assets, which will increase the book-tax income gap due to accelerated tax depreciation.
H2a: Controlling for General Business Conditions improves the explanatory power of the book-tax for earnings management. H2b: Controlling for General Business Conditions improves the explanatory power of the book-tax gap for tax sheltering.
Earnings Management
Again due to the accrual vs. transaction-driven nature of book vs. taxable income, the booktax income gap is also affected by financial reporting behavior, including earnings management (EM), which will generally be reversed for tax purposes. However, a benefit of analyzing the difference between book and tax income instead of book income and taxable income separately is that the effect of stock options is removed. Compustat adjusts Pre-Tax Income (DATA170) to maintain comparability (i.e., for minority interest or preferred stock dividends.) If Compustat adjusts DATA170, both Domestic and Foreign Pre-Tax Income (DATA272 and DATA273, respectively) will be set to missing even if they were disclosed. In a small sample, I found that more than 10% of firm-years missing DATA272 had in fact disclosed Domestic Pre-Tax Income. Despite this systematic Compustat bias, I use DATA170 if DATA272 is missing to preserve the sample size. This overstates BT_GAP but introduces additional noise in the measure and biases against finding results. In an untabulated robustness check, I delete the 501 observations that are missing DATA170 but are likely to have foreign income, as evidenced by nonmissing foreign income taxes (DATA64), foreign current exchange adjustment (DATA270), foreign pre-tax income (DATA273) or foreign deferred tax expense (DATA270). Results are unchanged.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles Variables
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles affect the calculation of book income but not taxable income. Therefore, they affect the book-tax income gap. I study the effect of changes in GAAP on the total variation in the book-tax income gap. In doing so, I measure BI under the current GAAP regime and test variables that quantify the effect of shifts in this regime. I study four FASB recorded for tax purposes, a temporary book-tax difference will exist for the difference between straight-line 15-year tax depreciation and cumulative impairments. However, most corporate control transactions are structured as tax-free reorganizations, which do not assign values to goodwill or other purchased intangibles. Even in a taxable stock acquisition, firms seldom restate tax basis to fair market value because a Section 338(h)(10) election requires the target to record taxable income on a deemed asset sale (Erickson, 1998) . Amortization expense will not be recorded for tax purposes, because no asset is recorded for tax purposes. In the event of a tax-free reorganization, SFAS 142 will lead to permanent book-tax differences throughout the life of the book asset. I measure the effect of SFAS 142 on both goodwill and non-goodwill intangibles. I define GW_IMPAIR as Impairments of Goodwill After-tax ( 
General Business Conditions Variables
General business conditions (GBC) influence the book-tax gap both by directly affecting the levels of income and by influencing investment decisions. First, GBC impact the current level of both book and taxable income. However, book and taxable income will not be equally affected, due primarily to different revenue and expense recognition rules. Second, GBC affect firms' current investment decisions. By both their direct effect on income and their influence on investment decisions, variation in GBC impacts variation in the book-tax gap through time and across firms.
I measure the direct income effect of general business conditions on the book-tax income gap as the industry-standardized change in Net Sales. 13 I first calculate the change in Net Sales (DATA12) for each firm, then average annually at the two-digit SIC code to get the industry-averaged rate of change in Net Sales. I multiply this rate by firm-level lagged Net Sales to create the variable ∆SALES.
The industry-standardized change in Net Sales may impact the book-tax income gap in a number of different ways. In general, during periods of growth, income increases faster than cash flows. Dechow, Kothari, and Watts (1998) model the impact of sales shocks on certain working capital accruals, such as Accounts Receivable. Sales growth causes most accruals to increase; many of these accruals are reversed in the calculation for taxable income. To the extent taxable income is somewhat closer to cash flows, the book-tax gap increases during booms and shrinks in bad times. Income level also affects ability to use credits and carryforwards. For example, the base for the Research & Development (R&D) credit uses current period sales. As current period sales increase, the allowable R&D credit will decrease, holding R&D spending constant. 13 To mitigate potential correlation between General Business Condition variables and one of the omitted variables, tax sheltering, I calculate rates for all GBC variables at the industry-level; this is further discussed in Section 6.1.
I next measure the impact of variation in general business conditions on firms' current investment decisions. These decisions include where to invest, in which projects to invest, and how to finance the investment. I include two variables that are intended to assess the impact of GBC on a firm's current decisions. The first variable is designed to measure the "cost" of financing, which I measure as the cost of financing with external debt. This measure gauges the ease with which the firm can make investments and how expensive it is to finance these investments. I calculate the cost of financing with external debt (COST_DEBT) as the industry-standardized annual interest expense.
Specifically, I calculate the interest rate for each firm and then average annually for each two-digit SIC, where interest rate is Interest Expense (DATA15) divided by average interest-bearing debt (sum of DATA9 and DATA34). 14 I then multiply this rate by the firm's average interest-bearing debt.
COST_DEBT could either increase or decrease BT_GAP. COST_DEBT could be negatively related to BT_GAP if increases in the cost of investing will decrease investments and therefore decrease the tax-book depreciation gap. Or, consistent with Mills and Newberry (2005),
COST_DEBT could be positively related to BT_GAP if firms use off-balance sheet financing to reduce finance constraints. Thus, I do not predict a sign for COST_DEBT.
Changes in general business conditions may also affect the decision about which investment to undertake. Potential investments include other firms, intangible assets or tangible assets. Because the IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR, and ∆INTANG variables all capture material effects of intangible assets on BT_GAP, I focus on the book-tax gap impact of tangible assets. I include a variable for industry-level capital expenditures because accelerated tax depreciation methods will increase BT_GAP during an economy of high investment. I first calculate the annual capital expenditure rate for each firm as Property, Plant, and Equipment -Capital Expenditures (DATA30) divided by beginning Gross Assets (DATA7) and average this rate annually for each two-digit SIC group. I then multiply this rate by firm beginning Gross Assets to generate the variable CAP_EX. 
Earnings Management Variables
Earnings management (EM) affects the book-tax income gap by affecting book income.
Because taxable income is largely calculated on a transaction-basis, earnings management does not affect taxable income. 16 For example, a firm may record a lower bad debt expense than is needed to meet an earnings target. The bad debt tax deduction is based on accounts written-off, not on accounting expense. Therefore, the decreased book expense does not affect taxable income. The recognition and subsequent reversal of accruals recorded for earnings management purposes will create temporary differences. Variation in earnings management behavior will cause predictable variation in the book-tax income gap.
I use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995) . Because the modified Jones model has been shown to systematically misestimate discretionary accruals in times of growth or decline, I use the standard Jones model, calculated at the industry-level (i.e., Dechow et al, 1998) . 17 I calculate the annual industry-average rate of normal accruals to assets using coefficients estimated from model (5) for each two-digit SIC group:
Where the variables are defined as:
15 Where DATA30 is missing, I set it equal to zero; this occurs for 8.9% of the observations. 16 Earnings Management generally occurs through accruals rather than through transactions. See Nelson et al (2003) where approximately 75% of earnings management attempts reported by auditors involved accruals. Many accruals will be reversed for taxable income. That 63% of the restatements in Badertscher et al (2009) were non-conforming also supports this assumption. See footnote 5 for a more thorough discussion. 17 I do not use performance-matched accruals as suggested by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) , because my sample is not an extreme performance sample where discretionary accrual misspecification is most likely. Performance-matched accruals are superior when the research design postulates that the sample is more likely to have engaged in Earnings Management than the control firms.
I calculate each firm's normal accruals by applying these industry coefficients to firm-level variables.
My proxy for earnings management, (D_ACC), is the residual from this model multiplied by firmspecific lagged Total Assets. I expect D_ACC to be positively related to BT_GAP. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are significant at the 10% level, few are significant in magnitude.
Sample Selection
Only five (nine) statistically significant Pearson (Spearman) correlations exceed 0.10. 19 In total, 18% of the observations are non-zero. While there are more non-zero observations in the early years in the sample, there are relatively less observations in these years. In each of the early years 1993-1999, at least 32% of the observations are non-zero. In the later years 2000-2004, 14% to 16% of the observations are non-zero. demonstrates that the variables considered here are important drivers of variation in the book-tax income gap, this result does calculate a rather significant upper bound of 45% for the omitted variables-changes to tax law and variation in tax sheltering behavior.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Predictable Variation in the Book-Tax Gap
[Insert Table 3 around here]
The economic magnitude and sign of the estimates are largely reasonable. As expected, IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR, ∆INTANG, and CAP_EX are positively and significantly related to BT_GAP. In addition, the significant GAAP change coefficients on IMPAIR and GW_IMPAIR are relatively close to their predicted value of 1.0. I find insignificant results for ∆OPEB.
21
COST_DEBT is also positively and significantly related to BT_GAP, consistent with the offbalance sheet financing story in Mills and Newberry (2005) . D_ACC is unexpectedly negative, but the coefficient is small. 20 I acknowledge a number of omitted variables, including tax sheltering. The goal of tax sheltering is to decrease taxable income without affecting book income, creating a positive book-tax income gap. Therefore, I do not expect this omitted variable to be mean zero. Primary results are estimated without an intercept so as not to force the residuals to be mean zero. This is important because the residuals are interpreted in Section 5.2. However, excluding the intercept may cause the R 2 to be overstated because it assumes the mean of the dependent variable, a component in the calculation of R 2 , is zero. In untabulated results, including an intercept in the primary regression generates an R 2 of 55.44% as compared with an R 2 of 55.43% in the regression without an intercept. Coefficients and significance levels are also unchanged. Excluding the intercept does not overstate the R 2 in this setting. 21 In untabulated results, I include observations from 1991-1992. Due to other variable requirements, this adds only 260 observations to the sample. Results are statistically similar. I next include observations from 1991-1992 while omitting the IMPAIR variable requirement in all years. Under this specification, the sample size nearly triples. I find a coefficient of 0.141 on ∆OPEB, which is significant at the 5% level, an R 2 of 23.45%, and coefficients and significance levels generally similar to those reported in Table 3 on all variables except ∆SALES which becomes insignificant. These results confirm that SFAS 106 had a significant impact on the book-tax income gap but that the sample requirements imposed by other GAAP changes limits my ability to document this impact.
CAP_EX, COST_DEBT, and D_ACC increase BT_GAP. The results imply that the booktax income gap would have been smaller without variation in general business conditions. The coefficients on IMPAIR, GW_IMPAIR, and ∆INTANG suggest that FASB statements related to impairments decreased the book-tax income gap, mitigating the effect of factors that increased the book-tax income gap. After controlling for the eight variables included in Table 3 and using the residual as an adjusted measure of the book-tax income gap, 36% of the firms in my sample report a lower adjusted than unadjusted book-tax income gap, while 64% report a higher adjusted gap.
Overall, the mean effect is an increase in the book-tax income gap of $5.7 million, resulting in a mean adjusted book-tax income gap of almost $6 million, nearly forty times higher than the mean unadjusted book-tax income gap reported in Table 2 .
To separate the effects of the three classes of variables, I regress BT_GAP separately on each class of variables in Table 4 . Column A reports the results of regressing BT_GAP on the four GAAP change variables. GAAP changes alone explain over half the variance in the book-tax income gap.
This result demonstrates that GAAP changes is the most important factor affecting variance in the book-tax income gap, even considering unmeasured factors such as tax sheltering. 22 The R 2 of my three general business condition variables on BT_GAP in Column B is 2.37%, while the effect of earnings management, in Column C, is an R 2 of only 0.49%. 23 Overall, I find support for my expectation that these factors explain a significant portion of the variance in the book-tax gap.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
22 Section 6.1. discusses potential correlation with the omitted variables, tax sheltering and tax law changes, and concludes that correlation between GAAP changes and either of these variables is likely nonexistent or very low. 23 Though the sum of the three separate R 2 is roughly equal to the R 2 reported in the full regression in Table 3 , I also calculate an incremental R 2 for each class of variables for robustness. In untabulated results, I find the incremental R 2 for changes in GAAP, GBC and EM is 52.82%, 3.89% and 0.62%, respectively. Interpretations are unchanged.
Interpretation of Prior Research that Uses the Book-Tax Gap
I next test demonstrate the importance of considering the full set of factors which impact the book-tax gap and test whether the book-tax income gap is a reasonable proxy for either earnings management or tax sheltering by replicating prior research. I do so using both an unadjusted book-tax income gap and a book-tax income gap separately adjusted for the three factors studied here.
Proxy for Earnings Management
Hanlon (2005) studies whether firm-years with large book-tax differences have less persistent earnings. The underlying assumption is that large book-tax differences include an abnormal amount of accruals, likely for the purpose of managing earnings. I study earnings persistence conditional on the size of the book-tax income gap, following the methodology in Hanlon (2005) . I first use the unadjusted book-tax gap and then separately subtract the effect of each of the three factors studied here to calculate an adjusted book-tax gap measure.
Column "Base" of Table 5 replicates Hanlon's (2005) equation (2) using BT_GAP to sort firm-year observations into Book-Tax Difference (BTD) size groups following the rubric specified in the original paper. Results are consistent with Hanlon's Table 3 . 24 Specifically, Column Base reports a negative and significant coefficient for both PTBI*LNBTD and PTBI*LPBTD consistent with Hanlon (2005) .
[Insert Table 5 around here]
Next, Column A uses the residual from Column A in Table 4 , the regression for GAAP changes alone, as an adjusted measure of the book-tax income gap to sort firm-year observations into adjusted BTD groups and re-estimate the model. Column A continues to report negative and 24 Because my measure of the book-tax income gap includes both permanent and temporary differences, which includes the effect of changes in the valuation allowance, I do not drop loss firms or firms with an NOL. This dramatically increases the size of the sample. Additionally, I drop firms with a greater than 5% increase in goodwill. This is done to strengthen confidence that changes in the income and cash flow figures between periods are not a result of significant merger activity. Results presented in Column Base of Table 5 are consistent with Hanlon (2005) despite these sample differences. Results are not sensitive to the inclusion of firm-years with large goodwill changes or to the exclusion of firms with an NOL but are sensitive to excluding loss firms.
significant coefficients for both PTBI*LNBTD and PTBI*LPBTD. Although the coefficient on PTBI*LNBTD is relatively similar between Column Base and Column A, the coefficient on PTBI*LPBTD in Column A is less than half the size of the coefficient on PTBI*LPBTD in Column
Base. This change provides no supports for H1a and in fact suggests that part of the lower persistence of income in firms with large positive book-tax differences is due to the GAAP changes studied here, primarily impairment-related, rather than to earnings management. 25 That the coefficient changes is somewhat intuitive-a book-tax income gap that includes impairments should be less persistent than a book-tax income gap that excludes these irregular items.
Column B uses the residual from Column B in Table 4 as the sort variable. The results in
Column B are very similar to those in Column Base, suggesting that general business conditions do not significantly affect the relationship between the size of the book-tax gap and earnings persistence.
These results provides no support for H2a.
Finally, Column C sorts on the residual from Column C in Table 4 , which only controls for D_ACC, and reports results quite changed from Column Base. Column C reports that firms with large negative book-tax differences, sorted after removing the effect of discretionary accruals, have more persistent earnings than firms with small book-tax differences. Additionally, the coefficient on PTBI*LPBTD is considerably attenuated after controlling for earning management. These results strongly support H3a. Despite the small effect that the variation of earnings management has on the book-tax income gap, this result suggests that controlling for this factor is still an important consideration when using the book-tax income gap. The results in Table 5 provide no support for either hypothesis H1a or H2a, but support H3a and confirm that the lower persistence earnings observed in Hanlon (2005) are due in part to earnings management. A further important implication 25 Though we might expect that firm-year observations with an impairment have a negative book-tax gap because the impairment decreased book-income below taxable income, there are instances where firm-years with an impairment have a positive book-tax gap. Thirty-one percent (20%) of the book-tax gaps for firm-years with a nonzero value for IMPAIR (GW_IMPAIR) are positive.
is that if researchers are using the book-tax gap as a proxy for earnings management, it is reasonable to use the unadjusted gap.
Proxy for Tax Sheltering
The book-tax gap is regularly used as a proxy for tax sheltering behavior. Recent literature, such as Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) and Desai and Dharmapala (2006) , adjusts the book-tax gap to improve its ability to proxy for tax sheltering. This section is in the spirit of this recent literature.
Lisowsky (2009) models the probability of a tax shelter using proprietary data on the existence of tax shelters. 26 Proxies for tax sheltering should be positively correlated with the predicted value I calculate from the Lisowsky model. 27 Removing the effect of other influences should increase the correlation between the book-tax income gap and the predicted probability of a tax shelter. Additionally, strong proxies for tax sheltering should have a higher correlation with the Lisowsky predicted value than weak proxies. I test these predictions in Table 6 .
28
[insert Table 6 around here]
Column A presents the primary sample of the paper. Column B excludes firm-years where Taxable Income is negative: tax sheltering is less likely in those years. Column C further limits the sample to where tax sheltering is most likely-where firm-years have both positive Taxable Income and a positive book-tax income gap, indicating that they reported positive Book Income but lower Taxable Income. Finally, Column D limits the sample to firm-years with an impairment because this is likely to be where the adjustments made in Column A of Table 4 will have the greatest impact. The 26 Wilson (2009) also models the probability of a tax shelter. Lisowsky (2009) reports an R 2 of 20.4% on his model, compared with an R 2 of 9.8% on his replication of the Wilson model, so I use the Lisowsky model here. 27 I calculate the Lisowsky predicted value omitting two variables which he models: BTD and TaxHaven. I omit BTD because including a scaled measure of BT_GAP in the calculation of predict could induce a spurious correlation with BT_GAP and all adjusted versions of BT_GAP. I omit TaxHaven because data is not electronically available on whether a firm has a subsidiary in a TaxHaven or not. 28 Table 6 presents Spearman correlations only. When using Pearson correlations, BT_GAP measures are only significantly correlated with the Lisowsky predicted values when tax sheltering is strongly predicted (TI > 0 and BT_GAP > 0); DTAX is never significantly correlated with BT_GAP. change in correlation between BT_GAP and predict and the alternative measure and predict and the p-value associated with that change in correlation are detailed below the alternative measures; significant correlation changes are presented in bold.
First, Table 6 shows that BT_GAP is positively and significantly correlated with the Lisowsky predicted value, predict, in all samples. Further, Table 6 shows that in three of the four samples, the unadjusted BT_GAP is more positively correlated with predict than is DTAX. The stronger correlation with predict is consistent with Lisowsky's (2009) evidence that the Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009) discretionary permanent book-tax gap measure (DTAX) does not explain his tax shelter variable. 29 The change in correlation between BT_GAP and DTAX is statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases.
The variable, Table 4A residual, is the residual from the regression of BT_GAP on the four GAAP changes. Controlling for GAAP changes increases the correlation with predict in a statistically significant manner in three of the four cases. When the firm-year includes an impairment, the correlation increases more than 50%. 30 However, the adjustment for GAAP changes does not increase the correlation in Column C, where the probability of tax sheltering is highest. Overall, the results in row ∆corr(BT_GAP, 4A residual) support H1b.
Adjustments for general business conditions, Table 4B residual, significantly decrease the correlation with predict, against the prediction in H2b. This suggests that the association between the book-tax income gap and tax sheltering found in prior research was driven in part by a common association with general business conditions, for example that tax sheltering is more likely during expansionary periods. This correlation may be problematic for researchers. A research design that uses the book-tax gap as a proxy for tax sheltering and studies a phenomenon also correlated with 29 DTAX measures discretionary permanent book-tax differences while the tax shelters in the Lisowsky (2009) measure generate both permanent and temporary book-tax differences. This discrepancy likely decreases the correlation between DTAX and predict. 30 In firm-years without an impairment, there is not a significant difference between the correlation between BT_GAP and predict vs. provide no support for H3b. Overall, the results in Table 6 show that BT_GAP is a reasonable proxy for tax sheltering but that its effectiveness can be increased, both in general and in cases where impairments exist, by adjusting for certain GAAP changes. Table 6 also suggests that researchers should be especially careful when using the book-tax gap as a proxy for tax sheltering and studying its relationship with variables that are also likely correlated with macroeconomic conditions.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Correlation with Omitted Variables
An assumption that underlies each of the three hypotheses is that the alternative factor being examined is uncorrelated with the omitted factors-tax sheltering behavior and changes to tax law. If the examined factors are correlated with the omitted factors, I may overstate the variance attributable to the examined factors and understate the variance attributable to the omitted factors. Because of this, I am sensitive to the importance of this assumption.
The assumption of uncorrelatedness is more reasonable for some of my alternative factors than for others. First, I assert that GAAP Changes are uncorrelated with changes to tax sheltering and tax law and that changes in earnings management for financial statement purposes are uncorrelated with changes in tax law. It is difficult to construct a scenario where an exogenous GAAP change results in a change in tax sheltering behavior, as the aim of tax sheltering is to decrease taxable income without affecting book income. To test this assumption, I regress the GAAP changes I study on leading taxable income both one and two years forward. In untabulated results, I find no significance on any of the GAAP Change variables in either regression, which supports this assumption. While it is plausible that GAAP changes result in tax law changes, significant tax law changes are few during the period so the assumption of uncorrelatedness seems reasonable during this period for both GAAP changes and earnings management.
However, it is likely that changes in general business conditions and changes in tax law are Correlation may also exist between general business conditions and tax sheltering. Table 6 even suggests this, as adjusting for macroeconomic conditions decreases, rather than increases, the correlation between the book-tax gap and the predicted probability of a tax shelter. To mitigate potential correlation, I include rates for GBC variables at the industry-level, rather than at the firmlevel. I first calculate firm-level variables and then average them annually for each two-digit SIC group. 31 The industry rate is then applied to firm-level figures to scale the variables to dollars, comparable with the GAAP Change variables. I include all Compustat firm-year observations to compute the industry averages, regardless of whether the firm-year observation has the necessary variables to be included in the final sample. Although using firm-level numbers to scale the variables might introduce some correlation, calculating GBC variables at the industry-level should remove most of the potential correlation with tax sheltering because the firm characteristics shown to be related to tax sheltering will vary within industry. For example, Lisowsky (2009) finds that the probability of a tax shelter is increasing in the financial complexity of a firm and the percent of income that is foreign.
Both of these characteristics vary within industry.
I investigate the issue further by alternatively using industry-scaled GBC variables and industry-averaged GAAP change variables. These tests are intended to assess whether results found using firm-scaled GBC variables are due to additional variation in the data or to correlation with tax sheltering. Specifically, I calculate ΔSALES as industry-averaged percent change in Net Sales times industry-averaged lagged Net Sales, COST_DEBT as industry-averaged interest rate time industryaveraged average interest-bearing debt, and CAP_EX as industry-average capital expenditure rate times industry-averaged Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment.
Panel A of Table 7 replicates Table 3 , replacing firm-scaled GBC variables with industryscaled GBC variables. While CAP_EX remains significant, COST_DEBT becomes insignificant. 31 An alternative design would average the source variables and then calculate general business conditions using the Industry means. This approach size-weights the variables. Because size has been shown to be correlated with tax sheltering (see Lisowsky, 2008) , I avoid weighting the General Business Condition variables.
The R 2 of the regression falls from 55.43% to 51.72%. In untabulated results, the industry-scaled GBC variables have an incremental R 2 of 0.18%, which has little economic effect. Contrary to the firm-scaled GBC incremental R 2 of 3.89% discussed in Section 5.1., industry-scaled GBC variables offer no explanatory power for the book-tax income gap.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
It is difficult to determine whether the significance found using firm-scaled GBC variables is due to increased power in the firm-scaled variables or whether the firm-specific variables used to scale are correlated with tax sheltering. To provide a benchmark for the power lost when firmspecific values are replaced by industry-averaged values, I annually average each of the four GAAP change variables at the two-digit SIC code. Panel B of Table 7 replicates Table 3 , replacing firmspecific GAAP Change variables with industry-averaged GAAP Change variables. While IMPAIR remains significant, GW_IMPAIR loses significance; the R 2 falls from 55.43% to 3.10%. In untabulated results, the industry-averaged GAAP Change variables offer an incremental R 2 of only 0.49%, significantly less than the separate firm-specific GAAP Change incremental R 2 of 52.82% discussed in Section 5.1.
The alternative variable calculation methods presented in Table 7 provide comfort that predictable variation results found using firm-scaled GBC variables are due to the powerful variation in firm-scaled variables rather than to correlation with the unmeasured variables induced by the scaling method. Both industry-averaged GAAP Change variables and industry-scaled GBC variables provide dramatically lower explanatory power than their firm-specific or firm-scaled counterparts.
Omission of Tax Law Changes
Both because there are relatively few significant tax law changes compared to significant GAAP changes and because the effects of tax law changes are challenging to estimate from financial data, I omit tax law changes in my model and my tests. To be more complete, in this section I discuss four significant tax law changes and their potential impact on this research. I continue to assert that omitting changes in tax law does not bias inferences from this study.
Internal Revenue Code Section 197 (IRC 197) , effective for acquisitions after 08/10/1993, introduced amortization of intangible assets acquired in a taxable acquisition. Prior to IRC 197, intangible assets acquired in a taxable acquisition retained their original tax basis throughout their life. While IRC 197 becomes effective early in my study, it does not apply retroactively and so has less impact than might be originally thought. Additionally, Weston and Johnson (1999) find that twothirds of mergers between 1992 and 1998 were non-taxable; IRC 197 only applies to taxable mergers. Omitting a control for the application of IRC 197 is not likely problematic for this study.
Effective 01/01/1997, the Internal Revenue Service put into effect new "check the box"
regulations that allow unincorporated entities to choose whether to be taxed as partnerships or corporations. These new regulations offered planning opportunities for both minimizing state taxes and U.S. taxation of the foreign income of U.S. multinationals, making it easier to decrease tax expense and taxes paid and increasing the book-tax gap. Because this particular tax law change may be used for aggressive tax sheltering, I would not control for these regulations even if an adequate control were available because my research design specifies that the effect of tax sheltering, including the effect of the "check the box" regulations, should remain in the residual.
The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 enacted an additional first-year depreciation deduction (termed "bonus" depreciation) on property placed into service after September 10, 2001. Bonus depreciation will decrease taxable income and increase the book-tax income gap. CAP_EX, my general business condition variable for investment, will likely absorb some of the effect of bonus depreciation. Including firm-level capital expenditures or a dummy variable controlling for the bonus depreciation period does not change results presented in Table 3 .
The 
Scaled Tests
Prior literature sometimes scales the book-tax income gap, usually by current or lagged assets. For consistency, I perform the analysis in Table 3 scaling all variables by lagged Total Assets.
Though the R 2 does fall to 39.89%, results are otherwise quite similar and the interpretations-that GAAP changes explain a considerable portion of the variance (incremental R 2 of 34.33%), that GBC contribute incrementally (incremental R 2 of 4.75%) and that earnings management is a weak influence (incremental R 2 of 0.04%)-are unchanged.
[insert Table 8 around here]
Consideration of Stock Option Expense
Theoretically, whether a firm expenses stock option compensation or not, the difference between book and taxable income should be clean with respect to stock options. However, because my time period covers the post-Enron, pre-SFAS 123R period when some firms were electing to expense options and others were not, I empirically test whether stock option compensation affects my results in two ways. First, I exclude firms for which Compustat has non-missing information for Stock Compensation Expense (DATA398). Compustat provides a non-missing observation for 6576 firm-years in my sample; 35% of these observations occur in 2004. In untabulated results, the R increases from the 55.43% reported in Table 3 to 61.45%; the increase is attributable to GAAP changes. Second, I include Stock Compensation Expense in the primary regression. The R2 is nearly identical to that reported in Table 3 . In both tests, inferences from Table 3 are unchanged, suggesting that the book-tax gap is indeed clean with respect to stock option compensation.
CONCLUSION
Variation in the book-tax gap caused by variation in influential factors other than earnings management or tax sheltering may cause the book-tax gap to be a poor proxy for either earnings management or tax sheltering. I assess the validity of the book-tax gap as a proxy for earnings management or tax sheltering and to explore modifications that may improve the book-tax gap as a proxy for earnings management or tax sheltering.
I test whether the book-tax income gap is a reasonable proxy for either earnings management or tax sheltering in two ways. First, I quantify predictable variation in the gap during the period 1993 to 2004. I hypothesize that cross-sectional variation in general business conditions and earnings management as well as across-time variation in GAAP caused by changes to FASB Standards will cause predictable variation in the book-tax income gap. I find that the four GAAP changes I study explain over half the variance in the book-tax gap, that variation in general business conditions contribute some explanatory power and that variation in earnings management only weakly explains variance in the book-tax income gap. In total, the three factors I study explain more than 55% of the variance in the book-tax income gap from 1993-2004.
GAAP changes are the most significant influence on variation in the book-tax income gap.
General business conditions and earnings management increase the book-tax income gap, exacerbating the effect of other increasing factors such as tax sheltering and legal tax minimization.
GAAP changes mitigate the effect of these increases to some extent-absent the four GAAP changes studied here, the book-tax income gap would have been even larger. While I calculate a rather significant upper bound of 45% for the unmeasured factors, tax law changes and tax sheltering behavior, the four GAAP changes included alone explain over 50% of the variance. Though I show that macroeconomic conditions are a more important cause of variance than earnings management, this paper cannot establish the position of influence of tax law changes or of tax sheltering behavior relative to these other two factors.
Second, I investigate whether subtracting the effect of alternative factors that shape the booktax gap impacts interpretations of prior earnings management or tax sheltering research. I find that removing the effect of earnings management from the book-tax income gap causes the results in
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